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Abstract: The German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG) and its amendment of 2012 
highlight some fundamentals of collective redress in civil law countries at the example of model 
case procedures in the field of investor protection. That is why a survey of the ongoing activities 
of the European Union in the area of collective redress and of its repercussions on the member 
state level forms a suitable basis for the following analysis of the 2012 amendment of the 
KapMuG. It clearly brings into focus a shift from sector-specific regulation with an emphasis on 
the cross-border aspect of protecting consumers towards a “coherent approach” strengthening 
the enforcement of EU law. As a result, regulatory policy and collective redress are two sides of 
the same coin today. With respect to the KapMuG such a development brings about some 
tension between its aim to aggregate small individual claims as efficiently as possible and the 
dominant role of individual procedural rights in German civil procedure. This conflict can be 
illustrated by some specific rules of the KapMuG: its scope of application, the three-tier 
procedure of a model case procedure, the newly introduced notification of claims and the new 
opt-out settlement under the amended §§ 17-19. Investor protection through model case procedures – 
implementing collective goals and individual rights under the 
2012 Amendment of the German Capital Markets Model Case 
Act (KapMuG) 
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I.  Introduction  
In the long run the enforceability of investor rights may go hand in hand with the 
attractiveness of the respective capital market. That is why collective redress for 
retail investors is conceptualized as a question of market organization to be 
regulated by the legislator in light of the underlying market participants’ 
interests.  This became particularly clear when thousands  of retail investors 
bought Telekom-shares at the beginning of the century on the basis of alleged 
misrepresentations  in the prospectus
1  and  the Frankfurt trial court became 
inundated by 2100 individual lawsuits brought by 15000 individual plaintiffs with 
the help of 700 attorneys involved.
2 In reaction to the resulting congestion of the 
court, the German legislator enacted the German Capital Markets Model Case 
Act (“KapMuG”), which has been serving as an experimental law with a sunset 
clause until 1.11.2010, just being prolonged after an interim evaluation for 
another eight years until 2020.
3 In the meantime, in the Telekom-case there 
have been two decisions on the basis of such model case procedures by the 
                                                            
 
∗ Professor of Law, member of the executive committee of the House of Finance, Goethe-
University Frankfurt. This article is a revised and expanded version of a paper on “Implementing 
liability on the basis of model case procedures – the example of the German Capital Markets 
Model Case Act (“KapMuG”)” presented at the International legal symposium in the honour of 
the 50
th anniversary of The Marianne and Marcus Wallenberg Foundation at the Stockholm 
Center for Commercial Law on August 30, 2013 and to be published in the SCCL publication 
series. 
1 For the allegation in detail see A. Tilp, ‚Das Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz: Stresstest 
für den Telekom-Prozess‘, Festschrift Krämer (2009) p. 331 at p. 334-337. 
2 For the legislative history confer T. Duve and C. Pfitzner, ‚Braucht der Kapitalmarkt ein neues 
Gesetz für Massenverfahren?‘ Betriebsberater [BB] (2005) p. 673; A. Keller and C. Kolling, ‚Das 
Gesetz zur Einführung von Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahren – Ein Überblick‘, Bank- und 
Kapitalmarktrecht [BKR] (2005) p. 399. 
3 For the original version see „Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz“ (German Capital 
Markets Model Case Act [“KapMuG”]) of 16.08.2005 BGBl. I S. 2437; for the recent enactment 
of the prolongation see BGBl. I 2012, p. 2182.  
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Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) in Frankfurt in favor of the 
defendants (file nos. 23 Kap 1/06 and 23 Kap 2/06)
4, with an appeal pending 
before the Federal Supreme Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof). 
This legislative history already highlights the essential economic background of 
the statute, laying the foundation for its specific regulatory significance. Since in 
the  Telekom-case the sheer number of claims could have threatened the 
enforcement of the underlying regulation  within  reasonable timeframe,  the 
model case procedure as provided for by the German Capital Markets Model 
Case Act is supposed to be a means to aggregate, to a certain degree, small 
individual claims.
5 As such it aims to promote judicial efficiency and to reduce 
the risk of inconsistent adjudications in the same or very similar cases. This 
brings into focus the tension these model case procedures under the KapMuG 
are subject to: the tension  between  individual investor protection and the 
regulatory goal of “regulation through litigation”
6. 
At the same time, this over-arching  leitmotif of model  case procedures  may 
serve as the guideline for the following analysis of the question in how far the 
German KapMuG may serve as a suitable example of effective investor 
protection and its enforcement in light of specific parameters: A brief look at the 
conceptual framework of collective redress against the background of the 
development in this field in the EU and its Member States (II.) may help to put 
the device of model  case procedures  into perspective. On the level of 
substantive law (III.), the tension between individual and collective interests is 
reflected by the specific scope of application of the KapMuG (III.B.) and the 
procedural implementation of a three-tier procedure (III.C.). At the same time, 
the balancing of regulatory vs. individual interests leads to questions about the 
procedural position of the individual investor, as they become apparent from the 
new instrument of notification of claims (III.D.) and the investor’s right to opt out 
of a settlement (III.E.). 
                                                            
 
4 BGH, court order of May 16, 2012, file no. 23 Kap 1/06, BeckRS 2012, 10607; BGH, court 
order of July 3, 2013, file no. 23 Kap 2/06, BeckRS 2013, 11428.  
5 T. Möllers and S. Seidenschwann, ‚Der erweiterte Anwendungsbereich des KapMuG – Neues 
und altes Recht unter Berücksichtigung von BGH‘,Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 
(2012) p. 1268. 
6 See the corresponding title of the book edited by K. Viscusi, Regulation through Litigation 
(AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies [2002]).  
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II.  Conceptual Framework 
A.  Development of collective redress in Europe: Towards a “coherent 
approach” 
As becomes clear from the afore-mentioned goal of model  case procedures 
under the German KapMuG, the latter possess  characteristics of consumer 
collective redress mechanisms. Looking at the EU regulatory concept, collective 
redress is part and parcel of a strategy towards an effective enforcement of the 
underlying regulatory goals, supplementing any public enforcement.
7 This may 
serve as an explanation why collective redress as a means to improve 
consumers’ material rights has gradually been introduced to a growing number 
of fields of regulation. Under the Directive on misleading advertising of 1984 
Member States may empower persons or organizations with  a  “legitimate 
interest” to bring legal action.
8  The regulatory goal of  consumer  protection 
becomes even more apparent in the case of the Directive on injunctions for the 
protection of consumers’ interests enacted in 2009
9 because any payment by 
the defendant for noncompliance with a court order will benefit public funds, 
thus resulting in a potential tool to implement regulatory policy. The Directive 
2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights is another 
instance of such a regulatory strategy in the field of collective redress, aiming at 
an effective prevention of counterfeiting and product piracy and the effective 
enforcement of intellectual property rights.
10  In the field of antitrust the 
Commission published a White Paper on April 2, 2008, treating among other 
measures to ensure effective antitrust enforcement the regulation of collective 
redress, without, however, forwarding concrete legislative proposals.
11  The 
following draft proposal  presented informally in 2009 met intense internal 
debate and fierce criticism raised by the member states, so that it was 
                                                            
 
7 B. Hess,‘ “Private law enforcement” und Kollektivklagen‘, JuristenZeitung [JZ] (2011) p. 66 at 
p. 70. 
8 Art. 4 (1) of the Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning misleading advertising, of 10 September 1984, O.J. L250/17 of 19 September 1984. 
9 Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on 
injunctions for the protection of consumers‘ interests, O.J. L 110/30 of 1 May 2009. 
10 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights of 29 April 2004 , OJ L 195, 2.06.2004, p. 16. 
11 White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Brussels, 2.04.2008, 
COM (2008) 165 final.  
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withdrawn.
12  Subsequently in October 2010, the EU commissioners for 
Consumer policy, Justice and Competition proposed in a more general 
“coherent approach” taken in a Joint information note “Towards a Coherent 
European Approach to Collective Redress: Next Steps” very clearly that 
collective redress has to be looked at “…as an instrument to strengthen the 
enforcement of EU law”
13, hence as an implementation tool for regulatory goals 
of the EU. 
This approach was adopted and further specified by the European Parliament in 
its resolution “Towards a coherent European approach to collective redress”, in 
which it proposes “… a horizontal framework including a common set of 
principles providing uniform access to justice via collective redress within the 
EU and specifically but not exclusively dealing with the infringement of 
consumers’ rights…”
14  In addition to the regulatory significance of collective 
redress, the European Parliament also clarifies the method how to achieve it by 
providing in its resolution the “…need to take due account of the legal traditions 
and legal orders of the individual Member States…”
15 
With a view to this resolution, the European Commission published another set 
of proposals on private group  litigation, including among others a Draft 
Recommendation on promoting group claims
16, which, of course by its nature, 
is non-binding  and a proposal for a directive on private antitrust damage 
actions. It was jointly issued by the Justice, Consumer Affairs and Competition 
                                                            
 
12 For details of the draft proposal see F. Wagner-v. Papp, Der Richtlinien-Entwurf zu 
kartellrechtlichen Schadensersatzklagen, Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht [EWS] 
(2009) p. 445. 
13 SEK (2010) 1192 (Oct. 5, 2010), p. 3, 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/2/2010/EN/2-2010-1192-EN-1-0.Pdf (accessed on 
October 30, 2013). 
14 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European 
Apprach to Collective Redress’ (2011/2089(INI)), para 15, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-
0021+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
15 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European 
Apprach to Collective Redress’ (2011/2089(INI)), para 16, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-
0021+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
16 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations 
of rights granted under Union Law, C (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013.  
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department of the Commission.  The proposed binding directive on private 
antitrust damage actions must, to be sure, be considered and passed by the 
European Parliament and the Council yet.
17  It includes rules on the use of 
evidence, the effect of decisions by national competition authorities, the 
applicability of joint and several liability, and the availability of a pass-on 
defense. 
In contract, in  the non-binding recommendation, the Commission takes a 
coherent approach envisaging the regulation of collective redress across 
different sectors, urging Member States to provide for relief for private plaintiffs 
for violations of competition, consumer protection, environmental and other laws 
on a collective basis under certain circumstances.
18 Its goal is not, however, 
harmonization as in the case of private antitrust damage actions. Instead, the 
Commission lays out some common, non-binding principles that should serve 
as guidelines for the Member States’ conception of collective redress 
mechanisms, overall aiming at facilitating access to justice, stopping illegal 
practices and enabling victims of mass damages to obtain compensation.
19 
Among these principles one can distinguish between general principles 
common to injunctive and compensatory collective redress
20 and more specific 
                                                            
 
17 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of 
the competition law provisions of the Member states and of the European Union, Luxembourg, 
11.6.2013, COM (2013) 404 final.  
18 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations 
of rights granted under Union Law, C (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
19 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations 
of rights granted under Union Law, C (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013, I. para. 1, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
20 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations 
of rights granted under Union Law, C (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013, III., available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013.  
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ones relating to injunctive collective redress
21  or compensatory collective 
redress
22 respectively. 
B.  General principles common to collective redress in the Member 
States 
1.  Injunctive collective redress – representative actions 
The principles common to injunctive collective redress necessarily focus on 
standing to bring a representative action. The most common collective redress 
mechanism, group actions, as they are available in Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK (England and Wales), are brought by groups of victims or 
by an ombudsman, consumer organization or a leading plaintiff and the 
judgment following a collection action can be enforced by all members of the 
group separately.
23 In representative collective actions, which are available in 
Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania and the UK, the person, 
organization or authority acting on behalf of a group of individuals can enforce 
the judgment he/it obtains, but not all members of the group represented.
24 It is 
clear that this type of collective action will lend itself for injunction procedures, 
but not lead to financial damages to consumers, as is the case in Austria, 
Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania and the United Kingdom. It 
stands to reason that in case of eventual damages obtained by the 
representative, but not enforceable by the individual victims, those are used for 
public policy purposes after being collected by the representative consumer 
                                                            
 
21 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations 
of rights granted under Union Law, C (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013, IV., available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
22 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations 
of rights granted under Union Law, C (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013, V., available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
23 For this classification see European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, 
Overview of existing collective redress schemes in EU Member States, July 2011, 
IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-17, p. 38; critical of classifications in light of the evolution of new types of 
collective actions and of combinations of the prototypes mentioned above cf. A. Stadler, 
Grenzüberschreitender kollektiver Rechtsschutz in Europa, JuristenZeitung [JZ] (2009) p. 121-
122. 
24 I. Benöhr, ‘Consumer Dispute Resolution after The Lisbon Treaty: Collective Actions and 
Alternative Procedures’, 36 J. Cons. Policy (2013) p. 87 at p. 91.  
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organization, without being distributed among the victims.
25  Therefore, the 
Recommendation provides for clear-cut requirements to grant standing to bring 
a representative action. Standing is only granted to public authorities, officially 
designated representative entities and entities certified on an ad hoc basis by a 
national authority or court for a particular representative action.
26  From the 
public policy goals to be pursued it follows that the two latter entities should 
have a non-profit making character, their main objective should be directly 
related to the rights granted under Union law that are claimed to have been 
violated and they should have sufficient capacity in terms of financial resources, 
human resources, and legal expertise.
27 
The necessary link between substantive law and regulatory infrastructure leads 
to a considerable importance and potential difficulty of the right choice of the 
entity granted standing to bring a representative action.
28 This may to some 
degree explain why group actions are the more  common collective redress 
mechanism and available in Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK 
(England and Wales).
29  They are brought by groups of victims or by an 
ombudsman, consumer organization or a leading plaintiff and the judgment 
following a collection action can be enforced by all members of the group 
separately, so that the identity of the representative does not play a role as 
important as in the case of a representative collective action.
30 The Swedish 
                                                            
 
25 I. Benöhr, ‘Consumer Dispute Resolution after The Lisbon Treaty: Collective Actions and 
Alternative Procedures’, 36 J. Cons. Policy (2013) p. 87 at p. 91. 
26 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations 
of rights granted under Union Law, C (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013, III. paras. 4-7, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
27 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations 
of rights granted under Union Law, C (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013, III. para. 4, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
28 D. Fairgrieve/G. Howells, ‘Collective Redress Procedures: European Debates’, in D. 
Fairgrieve and E. Lein, eds., Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2012) p. 15 at p. 39; for the practical difficulties cf. A. Layton, ‘Collective Redress: Policy 
Objectives and Practical Problems’, in D. Fairgrieve and E. Lein, eds., Extraterritoriality and 
Collective Redress, (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2012) p. 93, 97-98. 
29 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Overview of existing collective 
redress schemes in EU Member States, July 2011, IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-17, p. 38-40. 
30 For this classification see European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, 
Overview of existing collective redress schemes in EU Member States, July 2011, 
IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-17, p. 38.  
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legislator, for example, takes a broad approach not only with respect to the 
types of infringements covered by collective redress mechanisms, but also with 
regard to the forms of class actions which are permitted, ranging from class 
actions to be initiated by private individuals to representative procedures in the 
field of consumer and environmental law that organizations such as consumer 
associations or a government-appointed authority are granted standing for.
31 
Another example of a rather  variable approach is the Portuguese system of 
collective redress. Law 83/1995 on the right to take part in administrative 
proceedings and the right of popular action offers the possibility of a so-called 
‘popular action’ that can be initiated by a private individual, an association, or 
foundation on behalf of all the group members concerned, so that it has the 
effect of a representative litigation.
32  More  variety  has been, however, 
introduced by special legislation, such as provided for in Arts. 31 and 32 of the 
Securities Code, approved by Decree-Law 486/99 of November 13, 1999. 
These provisions give standing to noninstitutional investors, to associations for 
the protection of investors and to foundations whose aim is the protection of 
investors in securities. 
2.  Compensatory collective redress 
a)  Collective interest action and joint representative action in France 
A much narrower approach is taken in French law where two procedural 
instruments of a representative nature are worth mentioning in this context, that 
is the collective interest action (action d’intéret collectif) and the joint 
representative action. The first one grants standing to certain consumer 
associations to bring claims in cases of an infringement of the so-called 
‘collective consumer interest’ (Art. 421-1(1) of the Code de la consommation).
33 
Considering that it is only available to accredited consumer associations and 
that the resulting damages will be awarded to these associations, the 
                                                            
 
31 see R. Nordh, ‘Group Actions in Sweden: Reflections on the purpose of civil litigation, the 
need for reforms, and a forthcoming proposal’, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. (2001) p. 381 at p. 
397-398. 
32 H. Sousa Antunes, ‘Portugal’ in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. 
Sci. 2009, p. 161, at p. 162-166. 
33 D. Fairgrieve/G. Howells, ‘Collective Redress Procedures: European Debates’, in D. 
Fairgrieve and E. Lein, eds., Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2012) p. 15 at p. 23; V. Magnier, ‘France’ in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals 
Am. Acad. Pol. Sci 2009, p. 114 at p. 116.  
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representative nature of this procedural mechanism becomes clear.
34  In 
contrast, the joint representative action can be initiated in the individual interest 
of consumers, but in light of the limitations on the way in which the mandate to 
act can be solicited its practicality is highly limited.
35 Against this background, 
the French government initiated a new Consumers Act providing for 
compensatory group actions (action de groupe) in Arts. 1 and 2 on May 2, 2013, 
which is still pending before Parliament.
36 According to Art. 1 of the proposed 
act, these actions can only be brought in consumer and competition cases (Art. 
L 423-1). Only material, but no moral damages can be claimed by national 
consumer associations, who act on behalf of consumers and are the only 
entities with standing to initiate such an action (Art. L. 423-1), so that the 
representative nature of this procedure is beyond question. 
b)  Collective action in England and Wales – Sectoral approach 
Things are not quite as clear with respect to England and Wales. Despite the 
research-based support for the introduction of a generic opt-out collective 
action,
37  the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales forwarded rather 
detailed recommendations to the Lord Chancellor proposing a flexible form of 
collective action which could be brought on either an opt-in or opt-out basis 
according to the court’s decision in light of the circumstances of the individual 
case in July 2008.
38 Even so, Part 19.6 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides 
for a representative action granting standing for a claim for damages to an entity 
with no interest in the action itself, other than that of acting in a representative 
capacity.
39  Sectoral examples  can be found in competition law (section 47B 
Competition Act 1998)  and, as far as the dimension of consumer law is 
                                                            
 
34 V. Magnier, ‘France’ in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. Sci 2009, 
p. 114 at p. 116-117. 
35 For the prohibition of solicitation through a website cf. Cour de Cassation 26 May 2011, No. 
10-15676###. 
36 Projet de Loi relative à la consommation, no. 1015, déposé le 2 mai 2013, available at 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/projets/pl1357.asp, last visited on October 15, 2013. 
37 R. Mulheron, Reform of Collective Redress in England and Wales: A Perspective of Need, 
Research Paper for submission to the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales, 2008. 
38 J. Sorabji et al. (eds.), Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions – Developing a 
More Efficient and Effective Procedure to Collective Actions: Final Report, Civil Justice Council 
of England and Wales, London, November 2008, Recommendation 3, p. 145, available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/JCO%2FDocuments%2FCJC%2FPublications%2FCJC+papers%2F
CJC+Improving+Access+to+Justice+through+Collective+Actions.pdf, last accessed on October 
30, 2013. 
39 C. Hodges, ‘England and Wales’, in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals Am. Acad. 
Pol. Sci 2009, p. 105 at p. 106-108.  
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concerned, the Consumers’ Association is the only such body that may bring 
such a representative action (Specified Body [Consumer Claims] Order 2005 SI 
2005/2365).
40 
This was supposed to be fundamentally changed in 2009, when the Financial 
Services Bill introduced by HM Treasury adopted the reforms proposed in the 
CJC report, enlarging the range of potential claimants in the newly created class 
action  to include pre-designated bodies, individual claimants and bodies 
authorized on an ad hoc basis by the court.
41 In light of the upcoming general 
election, these provisions relating to collective actions were withdrawn from the 
Bill in April 2010. Instead, the consumer redress scheme as provided for in the 
Financial Services Act 2010 is a new possibility for the Financial Services 
Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority respectively, to intervene in cases of 
retail mis-selling and to award compensation to those investors it believes were 
affected. On the other hand, the legislator has been reluctant to introduce and 
facilitate actual collective damages claims in the narrow sense.
42 Only recently, 
the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS) has appointed a 
small panel of members to look at mis-selling, which has called for new 
legislation ensuring stronger collective redress powers.
43 
c)  Collective redress by sectors in Germany 
Germany also follows a sectoral approach in the field of collective redress, so 
that one has to differentiate among the mechanisms procedural law has to offer 
according to the specific law and redress that is sought.
44 The oldest and most 
common collective redress mechanism is the association or interest group 
                                                            
 
40 For more details about the development cf. J. Sorabji, ‘Collective Action Reform in England 
and Wales’, in D. Faigrieve and E. Lein, eds., Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2012) p. 43 at p. 49-56. 
41 Financial Services HC Bill (2009-10) [6] cls 18(5), 22(2)(b), (c), 24(2)(b), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmbills/006/2010006.pdf, last accessed on 
October 30, 2013; for details cf. J. Sorabji, ‘Collective Action Reform in England and Wales’, in 
D. Faigrieve and E. Lein, eds., Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2012) p. 43 at p. 60-61. 
42 For the priority of regulatory collective mechanisms over procedural rules of court in England 
and Wales see C. Hodges, ‘England and Wales’, in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals 
Am. Acad. Pol. Sci. 2009, 105, 106. 
43 Panel on mis-selling and cross-selling (10
th April 2013)(SJ015), Note 5, download at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201213/jtselect/jtpcbs/writev/misselling/sj015.htm. 
44 For an overview see D. Baetge, ’Germany’, in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals 
Am. Acad. Pol. Sci. 2009, 125-137.  
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complaint (Verbandsklage), whose rules were enacted in 1896 as part of the 
Act against Unfair Competition. Associations who aim to promote commercial 
interests (Verbände zur Förderung gewerblicher Interessen) have standing to 
bring a claim for injunction in the context of deceptive advertising. This type of 
representative action was extended to consumer associations in 1965 and 1977 
in certain respects: first the consumer associations were granted standing to 
seek injunctive relief under the Unfair Competition Act (§ 8 UWG), in 1977 the 
same applied to the Law on Standard Terms in contracts (AGBG). The Law on 
Standard Terms in contracts was repealed in 2002, though, but with respect to 
its substantive rules integrated in large part in the German Civil Code (§§ 305-
310 BGB).
45 
The rules on the right for consumer associations and commercial interest 
groups to seek injunctive relief have been included in the newly drafted and 
enacted Act on Injunctive Relief of 2002 (§ 1 UKlaG).
46 The latter goes beyond 
the regulation of injunctive relief against the use of unfair standard contract 
terms, making reference to violations of any provision protecting consumer 
interests in its § 2 UKlaG. Besides this rather general rule, there are specific 
provisions granting standing to certain qualified associations or interest groups 
in special sectoral laws, such as the Act against Restraints of Competition (§ 33 
para. 2 GWB), the Telecommunications Act (§ 44 para. 2), the Disability 
Discrimination Act (§ 13 “Behindertengleichstellungsgesetz [BGG]), and the 
Federal Nature Conservation Act (§ 61 BNatSchG). In all these cases collective 
redress is limited to injunctive relief sought by consumer associations and 
qualified interest groups, making up for enforcement deficits and thus pursuing 
regulatory goals quite directly.
47 
At the same time, from the point of view of consumers another enforcement 
deficit is remaining because on the basis of such proceedings only injunctive 
relief, but no monetary compensation is available. It is true that the German 
                                                            
 
45 Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz [Act to modernize the law of obligations] of November 
26, 2001, BGBl. I p. 3138. 
46 Unterlassungsklagengesetz [Act on Injunctive Relief] of November 26, 2001, BGBl. I p. 3138 
at p. 3173. 
47 H.W. Micklitz and A. Stadler, ‘Collective legal actions in Europe, especially in German civil 
procedure’, 17 EBLR (2006) p. 1473 at p. 1477.  
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legislator introduced claims for skimming off excess profits in the Unfair 
Competition Act (§ 10 UWG) and in the Act against Restraints of Competition (§ 
34, 34a GWB), which an infringer can be held liable for by consumer 
associations. Any resulting revenues then, however, have to be handed over to 
the Federal Treasury, thus only leaving the risk of litigation to the 
associations.
48  Therefore this more recent amendment to the portfolio of 
procedural devices of collective litigation in Germany has not really changed the 
latter’s primary regulatory focus.
49 
d)  Collective actions and settlements under Dutch law 
In contrast, in the Netherlands the 2005 enacted Act on Collective Settlements 
Mass Damage Claims (Wet collectieve afhandeling massaschade [WCAM]), 
which is one of two distinct mechanisms of collective redress under Dutch law 
besides the representative collective action according to the general principles 
of the Dutch law of civil procedure under Articles 3:305a-c of the Dutch Civil 
Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek; BW), introduced an innovative settlement procedure. 
Even though there have been some spectacular WCAM cases involving 
financial mass damages recently, such as the Dexia
50-,  the  Vie d’Or
51-,  the 
Shell
52- and the Converium
53-case, there is no denying the fact that the number 
of representative group action cases is higher and increasing.
54  The latter’s 
                                                            
 
48 For incisive criticism cf. H.W. Micklitz and A. Stadler, ‘Collective legal actions in Europe, 
especially in German civil procedure’, 17 EBLR (2006) p. 1473 at p. 1484. 
49 On the goal of the skimming-off claim to further consumer protection see F. Henning-
Bodewig, ‘A new Act against Unfair Competition in Germany’, 36 Int’l Rev. of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law [IIC] (2005) p. 421 at p. 432; for its doctrinal classification 
between tort law providing pecuniary damages and unjust enrichment and its aim to deprive 
infringers of their unjustified gains for general preventive reasons cf. H.W. Micklitz and A. 
Stadler, Unrechtsgewinnabschöpfung, (Baden-Baden, Nomos 2003) p. 113. 
50 Amsterdam Court of Appeals, 25 Jan. 2007, LJN: AZ7033, NJ 2007 No. 427 (Dexia). 
51 Amsterdam Court of Appeals, 29 April 2009, LJN: BI2717, NJ 2009 No. 448 (Vie d’Or). 
52 Amsterdam Court of Appeals, 29 May 2009, LJN: BI5744, NJ 2009 No. 506 (Shell Petroleum 
N.V. and the Shell Transport and Trading Comp Ltd. Et al. v. Dexia Bank Nederland N.V. et al.); 
for details cf. I. Tzankova and H. v. Lith, ‘Class Actions and Class Settlements Going Global: the 
Netherlands, in D. Fairgrieve and E. Lein, eds., Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2012) p.67 at p. 77-78. 
53 Converium, Court of Appeal of Amsterdam of 17 January, 2012, LJN: BV1026, NJ 2012 No. 
355; for details cf. I. Tzankova and H. v. Lith, ‘Class Actions and Class Settlements Going 
Global: the Netherlands, in D. Fairgrieve and E. Lein, eds., Extraterritoriality and Collective 
Redress (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2012) p.67 at p.78-81. 
54 For the large number of collective redress cases in the financial sector and the Dexia- and the 
Shell-case in particular see I. Benöhr, ‘Consumer Dispute Resolution after The Lisbon Treaty: 
Collective Actions and Alternative Procedures’, J Consum. Policy 36 (2013) p. 87 at p. 92.  
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scope of application is quite broad and has included the misleading prospectus 
by market introduction of World Online
55 and securities
56 cases.  
Even so, the prominence of the enumerated WCAM-cases indicates that these 
settlements may be gaining in popularity and for financial institutions collective 
actions may indeed act as an incentive to enter into a settlement.
57 In order for 
this line of reasoning to work, the settlement under WCAM provides for a 
procedural novelty, that is the opt-out approach. As a result, the settlements 
negotiated by investors associations have a binding effect on all investors 
similarly situated, except for those who declare to “opt-out”.
58  A 2012 
amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure  may  also  boost collective 
settlements, admitting questions to be immediately submitted to the Supreme 
Court by courts, if directly relevant to the case.
59 It is true that this amendment 
applies not only to class settlements, but to any situation of a greater number of 
claims based on the same or similar factual or legal issues. In light of the fast 
clarification of questions of law to be expected from the Supreme Court, it may 
induce parties to settle and pave the way for an expansion of the settlement 
system. 
Apart from this enlarged potential range for settlements, the Dutch legislator has 
also widened their scope of potential application in an Act of June 26, 2013, 
amending the Dutch Collective Settlements Act, which extends the latter’s 
applicability to bankruptcy cases and the introduction of a pre-trial hearing.
60 
The latter can be requested by either party to find out whether a settlement is 
viable. Thus incentives to settle are created early on. Since a party failing to 
                                                            
 
55 HR, 27 November 2009, LJN: BH2162, Ondernemingsrecht 2010, p. 119 (World Online). 
56 HR, 5 June 2009, LJN: BH2822, NJ 2012 No. 182 (Effectenlease). 
57 For the interaction between the collective action the collective settlement cf. I. Tzankova and 
H. v. Lith, ‘Class Actions and Class Settlements Going Global: the Netherlands, in D. Fairgrieve 
and E. Lein, eds., Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2012) p.67 at p. 74. 
58 From a procedural point of view H.W. Micklitz and A. Stadler, ‘Collective legal actions in 
Europe, especially in German civil procedure’, 17 EBLR (2006) p.1473 at p. 1490-1492. 
59 Wet prejudiciële vragen aan de Hoge Raad (Prejudicial Questions to Supreme Court), 
February 9, 2012, Staatsblad 2012, 65, available at 
http://www.eerstekamer.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vixgkclhezh0/f=y.pdf, last accessed on 
October 30, 2013. 
60 Wet tot wijziging van de Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade (Collective Settlements Act 
Amendment), June 26, 2013, Staatsblad 2013, 255, available at 
http://www.eerstekamer.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vjavdaqvvpzo/f=y.pdf, last accessed on 
October 30, 2013.  
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discharge his obligation to appear may be charged with the costs of the parties 
that appear, on this occasion, the opt-out mechanism can produce additional 
effects. Therefore overall, as a result of the Amendment the regulatory interest 
in a far-reaching settlement of a mass damage situation compels individual 
class members to opt out at an earlier stage of the litigation, if they disapprove 
of the settlement. 
3.  Model case procedures 
The opt-out approach of the Dutch Collective Settlements Act makes it 
considerably easier for the parties to reach a binding settlement, thus moving 
forward the litigation effectively. Quite similarly, achieving judicial efficiency in 
mass damage cases with a great number of claims on the basis of a judgment 
given effect over and above the parties to the model case itself is the issue of 
primary importance in model case procedures  as established in Germany, 
Austria and Greece, Portugal and to a certain degree in England.
61 Therefore 
this form of collective redress seems to put the emphasis on its procedural 
function to aggregate a multitude of equal or similar cases into one single 
proceeding just as is the case in the collective settlement under the WCAM.
62 
In contrast to the important role of consumer associations and interest groups in 
the above-mentioned fields of consumer-related mass litigation, in model case 
act procedures only individuals have standing. Under Portuguese law test 
claims are provided for in the rules of administrative procedure law and are 
brought to bear if twenty actions have been initiated with respect to the same 
legal relationship or if twenty actions can be decided on the basis of an 
application of the same norms to identical situations of fact.
63  Austrian law 
provides for a representative test case action, so that the Consumer Information 
Association can represent a consumer who assigns claims to it and there is 
agreement between the parties that the result of the test case is also binding for 
                                                            
 
61 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Overview of existing collective 
redress schemes in EU Member States, July 2011, IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-17, p. 39; for the 
procedural function cf. H.-W. Micklitz and A. Stadler, ‘Collective legal actions in Europe, 
especially in German civil procedure’, 17 EBLR (2006) p. 1473 at p. 1478. 
62 H.-W. Micklitz and A. Stadler, ‘Collective legal actions in Europe, especially in German civil 
procedure’, 17 EBLR (2006) p. 1473 at p. 1478. 
63 H. Sousa Antunes, ‘Portugal’ in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. 
Sci. 2009, p. 161, at p. 162-163.  
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the other claims.
64 More specifically, in litigation in the field of partial debenture 
a statute of 1874 authorizes the appointment of a curator representing investors 
in court, thus exemplifying an early model case procedure for investor 
protection purposes.
65
  In contrast, in Switzerland these procedures have 
originated from agreements between the defendant and the claimants that a 
test case brought by one of the claimants will be binding between the defendant 
and all claimants, without however producing res iudicata effect for anyone not 
formal party to the litigation.
66 Similarly to Austrian law, Art. 86 of the Swiss Act 
on Collective Investment  (‘Kollektivanlagengesetz’ [KAG])  provides for the 
appointment of a representative of the investors for liability claims precluding 
single investors from any action and producing res iudicata effect for every 
investor.
67 
Similar to the above-mentioned  model case procedures the English civil 
procedural rules enable courts to select and determine a small number of 
claims in order to manage mass litigation, when there are a lot of claims raising 
the same factual or legal issues. Similar to the German model case procedures 
the English civil procedural rules also enable courts to select and determine a 
small number of claims in order to manage mass litigation, when there are a lot 
of claims raising the same factual or legal issues. This has been the case in the 
bank charges litigation
68, when the Financial Ombudsman Service and the 
County courts were flooded by individual claims which came to a standstill when 
the Office of Fair Trading and the bank set up what virtually amounted to a test 
                                                            
 
64 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Overview of existing collective 
redress schemes in EU Member States, July 2011, IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-17, p. 14; G. Kodek, 
‘Austria’ in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. Sci. 2009, p. 86, at p.87. 
65 Reference is made to this early example in the explanatory memorandum to the KapMuG, 
see Begründung KapMuG-RegE, Bundestags-Drucks. 15/5091, p. 16. 
66 For the background in the 80s when a number of claims by farmers under the Nuclear 
Liability Act following the nuclear explosion in Chernobyl led to the first test-case contract 
between the Swiss federal government and the claimants see S. Baumgartner, ‘Class Actions 
and Group Litigation in Switzerland’, 27 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. (2007) p. 301 at p. 342. 
67 Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz in der Schweiz – 
Bestandsaufnahme und Handlungsmöglichkeiten, Bericht des Bundesrates, Bern, July 3, 2013, 
available at https://www.bj.admin.ch//content/dam/data/pressemitteilung/2013/2013-07-03/ber-
br-d.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013; for the legal situation under the former Act on 
Investment Funds (‚Anlagefondsgesetz‘ [AFG]) see Begründung KapMuG-RegE, Bundestags-
Drucks. 15/5091, p. 16. 
68 The Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National Plc & Others [2009] UKSC 6.  
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case.
69 Other examples include the extreme Railtrack-case of 2005 with almost 
48,000 former shareholders suing the Government for allegedly trying to 
withhold shareholder compensation upon the re-nationalisation of the 
business.
70 In particular, the group litigation order according to Part 19 III of the 
Civil Procedure Rules
71 offers possibilities of flexible case management thanks 
to the discretion granted to the judge. The latter’s guideline is just as in model 
case procedures procedural efficiency, i.e. a minimum of delays and low and 
proportionate cost.
72 Not surprisingly, the group litigation order has to rely on a 
register and cannot do without a binding effect of the ensuing judgment for the 
registered parties. The discretion of the court goes so far as to select a claim 
from the register as a test claim (Rule 19.13 [b]). 
Looking at the German law of civil procedure and its principles more generally, 
it comes as no surprise that in Germany a very distinct model of model case 
procedure prevails in comparison with the legal systems just described. The 
important role of the principle of party control over the proceedings 
(Dispositionsmaxime) and the closely related principle of party control of facts 
and means of proof (Verhandlungsgrundsatz  or  Beibringungsgrundsatz) 
illustrate the dominant role of the individual parties in German civil procedure 
and the resulting procedural problems to bundle the underlying claims that 
belong to different claimants. Accordingly, these are the issues that shape the 
current German legal debate in this field. 
                                                            
 
69 C. Hodges, Developments in Collective Redress in the European Union and United Kingdom 
(Working Paper 2010), available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/1010%20Class%20Actions%
20UK%202010%20Report.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013, p. 6-7. 
70 Geoffrey Rutherford Weir & Ors v. (1) Secretary of State for Transport (2) Department for 
Transport [2005] EWHC 2192 (Ch). 
71 Rules of Civil Procedure, Part 19 III Group Litigation, available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part19#III, last accessed on October 
30, 2013. 
72 see C. Hodges, ‘England and Wales’, in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals Am. 
Acad. Pol. Sci. 2009, p. 105 at p. 109.  
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III.  The German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG) of 
2005 and its amendment of 2012 
A.  Capital markets model cases – practical experience and empirical 
findings 
It stands to reason that the significant role of individual procedural rights brings 
about distinct limits to collective litigation mechanisms. As a result, when it 
comes to retail investor protection, in the German two-tier legal framework for 
the provision of investment services hand in hand with its implementation via 
civil liability in courts goes its public enforcement by supervisory authorities.
73 
On the EU-level the potential divergence between the enforcement of the MiFID 
and investor enforcement of good behavior by investment firms  becomes 
evident,  civil liability regimes and  procedural mechanisms in this field falling 
within the legislative power of the Member States.
74  At the same time, this 
makes clear the significance of the liability as provided for by Art. 6 of the 
Prospectus Directive
75, serving as the legal basis for the Telekom  plaintiffs’ 
claims. 
Until September 2009 in 24 cases petitions for  determination in a model 
procedure were filed, in 12 procedures model case procedures were initiated, 
but only two led to model case decisions, another two to final rulings.
76 Up to 
that point there had only been model case decisions in the DaimlerChrysler- 
and the LBB Fonds 13-cases, the first one being decided against the claimants, 
the latter finding a few errors in the prospectus. The empirical findings of the 
study by Halfmeier/Feess of 2009 do not, of course, consider yet the decisions 
                                                            
 
73 See from the perspective of substantive law O. Cherednychenko, ‘The Regulation of Retail 
Investment Services in the EU: Towards the Improvement of Investor Rights?’ 33 J. Consum. 
Policy (2010) p. 403 at p. 416-418. 
74 O. Cherednychenko, ‘The Regulation of Retail Investment Services in the EU: Towards the 
Improvement of Investor Rights?’, 33 J. Consum. Policy (2010) p. 403 at p. 417; N. Moloney, 
‘Effective Policy Design for the Retail Investment Services Market: Challenges and Choices’, in: 
G. Ferrarini and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Investor Protection in Europe: Corporate Law Making, 
The MiFID and Beyond Post FSAP (Oxford University Press 2006) p. 382 at p. 424-425. 
75 Directive 2010/73/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
amending Directives 2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered 
to the public or admitted to trading and 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency 
requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on 
a regulated market, O.J. L 327, 11.12.2010, p. 1-12. 
76 For an exhaustive empirical overview cf. A. Halfmeier/P. Rott/E. Feess, Evaluation des 
Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetzes; Forschungsvorhaben im Auftrag des 
Bundesministeriums der Justiz, Abschlussbericht, Frankfurt am Main, 14. Oktober 2009, 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 2010, p. 50-55.  
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in the Telekom-case
77  mentioned above.  Looking at the number of cases 
reported as model cases, one also has to take into consideration that a lot of 
times petitions for determination in a model procedure are filed, but rejected and 
not reported on grounds of inadmissibility. 
B.  Scope of application 
This restriction touches on the scope of application of the German Capital 
Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG) of 2005. According to § 1 para. 1 sent. 1 of 
the KapMuG the main procedure of a model case must be concerned with a 
claim for damages because of inaccurate, misleading or omitted public capital 
market information. As a result, claims for damages based on alleged breaches 
of duties of an investment advisory contract cannot be brought in a model case 
procedure.
78  This limitation makes  it  clear that model  case decisions do not 
primarily aim at awarding damages to investors, but rather at clarifying common 
questions of fact or law with binding effect for a large number of similar cases. 
In doing so, a model case decision will deal with closely connected questions, 
such as (a) the materiality of specific information, (b) its accurate and possibly 
misleading content, (c) the knowledge of the defendant about the deficiencies of 
this information.
79 Since these questions will typically be relevant for a variety of 
claims, jurisdiction to render a model case decision does not lie with trial courts, 
but with the higher-level regional appellate courts. 
This rather limited scope of application of the KapMuG makes evident one 
important aspect of this procedure – its two goals being directed towards the 
implementation of the Prospectus Directive and towards the enforcement of 
individual retail investor rights being on an at least almost equal footing.
80 How 
                                                            
 
77 BGH, court order of May 16, 2012, file no. 23 Kap 1/06, BeckRS 2012, 10607; BGH, court 
order of July 3, 2013, file no. 23 Kap 2/06, BeckRS 2013, 11428. 
78 As stated in the explicit wording of the former § 1 para. 1 no. 1 of the KapMuG; see the case 
law of the German Federal Court of Justice BGH, NZG 2007 p. 350; BGH, BGHZ 177, 88; BGH, 
NJW 2009 p. 513; BGH, NJW 2009 p. 2539; BGH, NZG 2011 p. 151; BGH, NZG 2012 p. 1268. 
79 In more detail on the legal questions typically highly relevant for a test case see A. 
Halfmeier/P. Rott/E. Feess, Evaluation des Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetzes, 
Forschungsvorhaben im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums der Justiz, Abschlussbericht, Fankfurt 
School of Management, 2009, p. 43-48; for a very brief overview cf. F. Contratto, ‘Access to 
Justice for Investors in the Wake of the Financial Crisis’, SZW/RSDA (2009) p. 176 at p. 185-
187. 
80 On the regulatory goal to be implemented by the KapMuG see the Explanatory Memorandum 
to the German Model Test Case Act BT-Drucks. 15/5091, p. 16; B. Hess, ‚“‘Private law 
enforcement” und Kollektivklagen‘, JuristenZeitung [JZ] (2011) p. 66 at p. 68.  
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this translates into the actual model  case procedure  as provided for by the 
KapMuG remains to be seen. It is true, though, that in § 1 para. 1 no. 2 of the 
recent amendment of the KapMuG of 2012  the  scope of application of the 
model  case procedure  has been  broadened to now also include claims for 
damages resulting from the use  of inaccurate or  misleading public capital 
market information as well as those flowing from the failure to adequately inform 
about the inaccurate or the misleading content of public capital market 
information.
81 
This broadening, however, comes at a price for potential claimants. At first 
glance, this amendment seems to finally subject the same facts of retail investor 
disputes to a coherent and comprehensive set of procedural rules, thus possibly 
avoiding inconsistent decisions.
82  At the same time, the  inclusion of these 
claims may lead to a stay of the proceedings in the individual lawsuit of a retail 
investor where the trial court finds of its own motion that the decision will 
depend on the declaratory judgment as desired in the model case procedure (§ 
8 of the German Model Case Act 2012). As a result, the individual claimant will 
find himself to be part of a mass litigation and subject to the delays this will 
entail. This sheds some light on the problems arising from the way an individual 
may be forced into a model case under the KapMuG leaving it by and large to 
the judgment of the courts whether to stay an individual lawsuit with a view to a 
pending model case.
83 Critics point out resulting unnecessary delays which may 
be in conflict with Art. 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Charter of Fundamental 
                                                            
 
81 Explanatory Memorandum to the Amendment to the German Model Test Case Act of 2012 
BT-Drucks. 17/8799, p. 16; for more details see A. Halfmeier, ‘Zur Neufassung des KapMuG 
und zur Verjährungshemmung bei Prospekthaftungsansprüchen‘, Der Betrieb [DB] (2012), 
2145. 
82 K. Rotter, ‚Stellungnahme zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Kapitalanleger-
Musterverfahrensgesetzes v. 16.4.2012‘, p. 6, download at 
http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/ausschuesse17/a06/anhoerungen/archiv/20_KapMug/04_
Stellungnahmen/Stellungnahme_Rotter.pdf;  pointing out pros and cons D. Junck, Die Reform 
des Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetzes aus dem Blickwinkel der richterlichen Praxis v. 
25.4.2012, p. 3-5, download at 
http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/ausschuesse17/a06/anhoerungen/archiv/20_KapMug/04_
Stellungnahmen/Stellungnahme_Junck.pdf. 
83 For the margin of discretion of the court in this question see in the Explanatory Memorandum 
to the German Model Test Case Act BT-Drucks. 15/5091, p. 20.  
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Rights of the European Union.
84 This is why there is the proposition to replace 
this approach with an opt-in or opt-out mechanism as it is common in other 
jurisdictions.
85 
C.  The three-tier procedure of a model case procedure 
Even though a model  case procedure  is marked by its adversarial structure 
involving two parties, its main characteristics indicate some regulatory control 
over the progress of the proceedings and a certain tension between these two 
different procedural principles.
86 The initiative to file a petition for a model case 
decision is left to the parties, it can be either the plaintiff or the defendant to file 
such a petition in a case pending before the trial court.
87 Once the sufficiency of 
the motion is approved, the latter is published in an electronic register (§ 2 of 
the German Capital Markets Model Case Act [KapMuG]). As a result, the 
underlying individual proceedings are stayed (§§ 5, 6 para. 5 of the German 
Capital Markets Model Case Act  2012  [KapMuG]) for six  months until the 
quorum of at least nine more parallel petitions for determination in a model case 
procedure is reached. Otherwise the original proceeding of the individual lawsuit 
continues. In case the quorum is reached, the trial court issues the order for 
reference to the higher regional court (“Oberlandesgericht”), defining once and 
for all the legal questions to be subjected to the model case procedure. In view 
of the overriding importance of this ruling and its implications for the outcomes 
and success of the individual plaintiffs’ claims,  the role of the trial court 
formulating this order for reference is of utmost importance, since this ruling is 
                                                            
 
84 A. Halfmeier, ‚Zur Neufassung des KapMuG und zur Verjährungshemmung bei 
Prospekthaftungsansprüchen‘, Der Betrieb [DB] (2012) p. 2145 at p. 2146. 
85 A. Halfmeier, ‚Zur Neufassung des KapMuG und zur Verjährungshemmung bei 
Prospekthaftungsansprüchen‘, Der Betrieb [DB] (2012) p. 2145 at p. 2146. 
86 For a discussion of the KapMuG of 2005 against the background of basic principles of 
German civil procedure see B. Hess, ‚Der Regierungsentwurf für ein 
Kapitalanlegermusterfahrensgesetz – eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme‘, Wertpapier-
Mitteilungen [WM] (2004) p. 2329-2331. 
87 For brief overviews over the course of procedure of a model case procedure cf. B. Hess, 
‘Musterverfahren im Kapitalmarktrecht’, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] (2005) p. 1713 at p. 
1714-1717; F. Contratto, ‘Access to Justice for Investors in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: 
Test Cases as a Panacea?’ SZW/RSDA (2009) p. 176 at p. 186-187.  
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binding on the higher regional court according to § 6 para. 1 sent. 2 of the 
German Model Case Act 2012 (KapMuG).
88 
Under the former KapMuG the trial court also had jurisdiction to decide about 
plaintiffs’ petitions to extend the scope of the determination in the model case 
procedure. This inefficient division of responsibilities between the trial court and 
the higher regional court after the announcement of the order for reference to 
the higher regional court has now been eliminated in § 15 of the German Model 
Case Act 2012 (KapMuG) that provides for a transition of the control over the 
proceeding to the higher regional court.
89  Notwithstanding this improvement 
serious delays and inefficiencies still result from the plaintiffs’ right unlimited in 
time to submit a motion to extend the scope of the determination in the model 
case procedure, which seems to be one of the greatest obstacles to a rapid and 
reliable conduct of the model case procedure.
90 
Once the model case is before the higher regional court, the court selects of its 
own motion the lead plaintiff according to the criteria enumerated under § 9 
para. 2 of the German Model Case Act 2012 (KapMuG).
91 The other plaintiffs 
are joined to the proceeding as third-party petitioners who can validly undertake 
procedural steps as long as they are not inconsistent with the lead plaintiff’s 
declarations and litigation acts (§ 14 of the German Model Case Act 2012 
                                                            
 
88 For procedural delays resulting from the court’s freedom to formulate the ruling with binding 
effect on the higher court cf. M. Vollkommer, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] (2007) p. 
3094 at p. 3098. 
89 For criticism against the former rule see for example A. Halfmeier/P. Rott/E. Feess, 
Evaluation des Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetzes, Forschungsvorhaben im Auftrag des 
Bundesministeriums der Justiz, Abschlussbericht, Fankfurt School of Management, 2009, p. 57; 
for a positive evaluation of the new § 15 of the KapMuG 2012 see K. Rotter, ‚Der 
Referentenentwurf des BMJ zum KapMuG – Ein Schritt in die richtige Richtung!‘ Verbraucher 
und Recht [VuR] (2011) p. 443 at p. 447. 
90 See with references to court decisions B.W. Schmitz and J. Rudolf, ‚Entwicklungen der 
Rechtsprechung zum KapMuG‘, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] (2011) p. 1201 at 
p. 1206. 
91 For criticism against the court’s discretion to select a lead plaintiff confer T. Duve and C. 
Pfitzner, ‘Braucht der Kapitalmarkt ein neues Gesetz für Massenverfahren? Der Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes über Musterverfahren in kapitalmarktrechtlichen Streitigkeiten (KapMuG) auf dem 
Prüfstand‘, Betriebsberater [BB] (2005) p. 674 at p. 678.  
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[KapMuG]) and who are bound by the model case decision (§ 22 para. 1 of the 
German Model Case Act 2012 [KapMuG]).
92  
This  model  case decision then forms the basis for the award of individual 
damages in the individual cases before the trial courts (§ 22 of the German 
Model Case Act 2012 [KapMuG]). It goes without saying that a lot of times 
individual retail investors will, at this stage, still be confronted with difficult 
especially factual issues to be resolved in order to state their damage claims 
successfully. Problems such as establishing individual reliance on 
misstatements or causation of investment decisions by misstatements come to 
mind.
93 
Looking at the model case procedure as a whole, there is no denying the fact 
that it struggles with the frictions that result from the partial collectivization of 
claims. The latter may come into conflict with some basic principles of German 
civil procedure forming the foundation for the adversarial system, in particular 
the principle of party disposition. According to the latter it is for the parties to 
delimit the subject-matter of the proceedings.
94 In light of the final definition and 
formulation of the legal issues to be subjected to the model case decision in the 
order for reference to the higher regional court issued by the trial court, it is 
clear that the parties’ control is largely restricted. This goes  even further, 
                                                            
 
92 For more details on the position of the joined third-party petitioners in the proceeding before 
the higher regional court under the KapMuG 2005, which does not substantially differ from 
KapMuG 2012 in this respect, confer B. Hess, ‘Der Regierungsentwurf für ein 
Kapitalanlegermusterverfahrensgesetz – eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme’, 
Wertpapiermitteilungen [WM] (2004) p. 2329 at p. 2330-2331. 
93 For the causation problem and the closely-related issue of a shifting of the burden of proof 
confer ComROAD I and II, BGH, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 2007 p. 345 and 
346; ComROAD III, BGH, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht(NZG) 2007 p. 269; ComROAD 
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Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 2008 p. 385; ComROAD VIII, BGH, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 2008 p. 386; see also J. Hennrichs, ‚Haftungsrechtliche Aspekte des 
Rating‘, in: Festschr. Hadding, 2004, p. 875 at p. 891; T. Möllers, ‘Kausalität für den 
Differenzschaden und uferlose Haftungsausdehnung- Comroad I – VIII‘, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] (2008) p. 413; IKB, BGH, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 2012 at 
p. 318; for details on the IKB-decision cf. among others Bachmann, 
‚Anmerkung‘,JuristenZeitung (JZ) (2012) p. 571; Klöhn, ‚Die Haftung wegen fehlerhafter Ad-hoc-
Publizität gem. §§ 37b, 37c WpHG nach dem IKB-Urteil des BGH‘, Die Aktiengesellschaft [AG] 
(2012) p. 345 at p. 356. 
94 H.J. Musielak, Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung, 10th ed. 2013, Einleitung, Rn. 35.  
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considering the higher regional court’s selection of the lead plaintiff that is 
therefore also removed from party control. 
D.  Notification of claims and individual lawsuits 
In addition, the parties’ control over legal proceedings under this general 
principle also extends to the parties’ common agreement when to initiate the 
proceeding and when to end it. This raises the question how plaintiffs can join a 
model case procedure after its initiation. The model case decision by the higher 
regional court is  binding for the individual lawsuits whose proceedings have 
been stayed and are continued afterwards. In order to fully participate in the 
model case procedure in such a way, a retail investor has, of course, to file an 
individual lawsuit to begin with. This is particularly true because  the regular 
limitation periods for claims based on issuer liability because of incorrect ad-hoc 
notification are relatively short, that is one year only pursuant to § 37b, 37c of 
the German Securities Trading Act.
95 
If a plaintiff now wants to avoid the limitation of his claims and at the same time 
participate in the effect of the model case procedure, each and every plaintiff 
will have to file a conventional lawsuit. This would then add to the above-
mentioned congestion of the courts.
96  On the other hand, such a litigation 
strategy may turn out to be irrational for the individual claimant because of high 
litigation costs.
97 The latter include a share of the costs of the overall model 
case procedure  proportionate to the claim in relation to the total amount of 
claims (§ 24 para. 1 and 2 of the German Model Case Act of 2012 [KapMuG]). 
This applies for example to costs arising from the collection of evidence and 
                                                            
 
95 Pointing out the relatively short limitation periods in this field as a potential reason for a high 
number of individual subsequent claims A. Halfmeier/P. Rott/E. Fees, Evaluation des 
Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetzes, Forschungsvorhaben im Auftrag des 
Bundesministeriums der Justiz, Abschlussbericht, Fankfurt School of Management, 2009, p. 47-
48. 
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the limitation of their claims by way of registering with the Public Legal Information and 
Arbitration Office [Öffentliche Rechtsauskunfts- und Vergleichsstelle] A. Tilp, ‘Das 
Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz: Stresstest für den Telekom-Prozess’, in: Festschrift 
Krämer, 2009, p. 331 at p. 333. 
97 Further details on the incentive effects of relatively high entry requirements and the non-
existence of a nonformal participation A. Halfmeier/P. Rott/E. Fees, Evaluation des 
Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetzes, Forschungsvorhaben im Auftrag des 
Bundesministeriums der Justiz, Abschlussbericht, Fankfurt School of Management, 2009, p. 
101-103.  
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inquiries the claimant did not initiate or in any way control and he would 
therefore not have asked for in his individual lawsuit.
98 In any case, he is forced 
into the model case procedure for the reasons stated above in order to ensure 
to be able to ultimately enforce his individual claims. It stands to reason that one 
may question this practice to force an individual claimant into lawsuits. In fact, it 
reveals aspects of the model case procedure that show an instance where the 
law tries to take  advantage of the individual claimants’ incentives and their 
purses to use them and their lawsuits as a tool to enforce the regulatory goals 
of ad-hoc disclosure. In light of high litigation costs this enforcement policy may 
prove ineffective.
99 
On the other hand, the question has been raised how to mitigate the incentive 
effect resulting from the threat of a limitation of individual claims to file an 
individual lawsuit thus contributing to a growing congestion of courts and to 
further delays of the proceedings. In the recent amendment of the KapMuG 
2012 the legislator did not go so far as to introduce a true opt-in mechanism that 
would only require a claimant to simply declare his participation in the model 
case procedure with no need to file a lawsuit.
100 Instead, § 10 para. 2-4 of the 
German Model Case Act of 2012 provides that a simple “notification” of claims 
will suspend their limitation. After the model case procedure the notifying person 
has three more months to file his lawsuit before limitation sets in.
101 To be sure, 
this procedural simplification for the individual claimant, by no means, amounts 
to an actual joinder of procedures because the notifier does not participate in 
the model case procedure and the decision is not binding for him.
102 
                                                            
 
98 B.-W. Schmitz, in: M. Habersack/P. Mülbert/M. Schlitt (eds.), Handbuch der 
Kapitalmarktinformation, 2008, § 32 Rdnr. 312; A. Halfmeier, ‚Zur Neufassung des KapMuG und 
zur Verjährungshemmung bei Prospekthaftungsansprüchen‘, Der Betrieb [DB] (2012) p. 2145 at 
p. 2146-2147. 
99 For details on the litigation costs and criticism in this respect see K. Rotter, ‚Der 
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und Recht [VuR] (2011) p. 443. 
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101 For details on the limitation of claims under this new provision confer  A. Halfmeier, ‚Zur 
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Betrieb [DB] (2012) p. 2145 at p. 2147-2149. 
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E.  Opt-out settlement with court approval 
The only very limited participation of a notifier  also shows itself in his non-
inclusion in the newly introduced opt-out settlement under the recently amended 
§§ 17-19 of the German Model  Case Act of 2012 (KapMuG). This new 
procedure, partly borrowed from the above mentioned 2005 Dutch Act on 
Collective Settlements Mass Damage  Claims (Wet collectieve afhandeling 
massaschade  [WCAM]), offers the opportunity to plaintiffs in a model  case 
procedure to submit to the court a proposal for settlement.
103 The latter has to 
be approved by the court by way of an order from which no appeal shall lie, if it 
considers the proposal reasonable in light of the previous presentation of the 
main features of the case and the results of the hearings conducted with the 
parties so far (§ 18 para. 1 of the German Model Case Act of 2012 [KapMuG]). 
This seemingly high degree of court control over the settlement might be taken 
as an indication for prevailing regulatory interests brought to bear in the rules on 
the opt-out settlement. At the same time, judging from the Explanatory 
Memorandum the legislator primarily aimed at ensuring practicality and non-
discrimination
104, therefore § 18 para. 1 of the German Model Case Act of 2012 
can be taken as a provision to ensure a judicial assessment as to the basic 
fairness of the settlement proposal. This becomes apparent from the possibility 
to invalidate the settlement by an opt-out of at least 30% of the joined parties 
pursuant to § 17 para. 1 sent. 4 of the German Model  Case Act of 2012 
[KapMuG]. In addition to this invalidation of the settlement proposal by at least 
30% of the plaintiffs, the amendment of 2012 also offers the possibility to a 
joined party to opt-out on his or her own in case of discontent pursuant to § 19 
para. 2 of the German Model Case Act of 2012 [KapMuG]. 
Comparing the legal effect of the settlement under the German Model Case Act 
of 2012 with that under the Dutch Act on Collective Settlements Mass Damage 
Claims (Wet collectieve afhandeling massaschade [WCAM]), there are notable 
differences: Whereas the settlement in a German model case procedure is only 
                                                            
 
103 For parallels and differences with regard to the Dutch rule see A. Halfmeier, ‚Zur Neufassung 
des KapMuG und zur Verjährungshemmung bei Prospekthaftungsansprüchen‘, Der Betrieb 
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binding on the parties to the proceedings, under the WCAM a settlement is 
binding on every affected person irrespective of a lawsuit that has been filed.
105 
In addition, the Dutch provision enumerates a few reasons why a settlement 
may not be considered to be reasonable and therefore may not be approved by 
the court  as opposed to the German approach that without more seems to 
assume in general the reasonableness of the proposal.
106 Overall, one might 
conclude from these instances that the German procedure leaves a little more 
room for individual investor interests vs. regulatory goals than is the case in the 
settlement pursuant to the Dutch Act on Collective Settlements Mass Damage 
Claims (Wet collectieve afhandeling massaschade [WCAM]). 
IV.  Summary 
The German Model Case Procedure Act can be characterized by its main goals 
to improve individual investor protection by facilitating the enforcement of 
individual claims, to facilitate the enforcement of capital market regulation, and 
to reduce the burden on the judicial system.
107 These goals could not all be fully 
achieved at once with the German Model Case Procedure Act of 2005, as has 
become apparent on the occasion of the first cases, namely the Telekom-case 
to be litigated in such a procedure. These goals are, however, the criteria to 
focus on, when it comes to evaluating the latest amendment of this act in 2012. 
They are also the cornerstones of the on-going debate on collective redress in 
Europe where the European Commission has lately proposed a coherent 
approach. The latter calls for the regulation of collective redress across different 
sectors and urges the Member States to provide for relief for private plaintiffs in 
these sectors such as competition law, consumer protection, and environmental 
law. The general principles common to injunctive and compensatory collective 
redress laid out by the Commission are not targeted towards harmonization and 
make clear the broad variety of collective redress mechanisms in the Member 
States.  Apart from Germany, only a few of them provide for model  case 
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procedures, such as Austria, Portugal, Switzerland and to a certain degree 
England and Wales. In light of the considerable role of the individual claimant in 
this type of procedure, the importance of the German model is hardly surprising, 
given the dominant role of individual parties in German civil procedure. 
Therefore this is also the determinant of the German Model Case Procedure 
Act. 
By broadening the scope of application of the German Model Case Procedure 
Act in the Amendment of 2012, the legislator decided  to include claims for 
damages resulting from the use of inaccurate or misleading public capital 
market information as well as those flowing from a failure to inform about such 
inaccurate or misleading content. Besides improving  investor protection, this 
enlarged scope of application may also subject an individual claimant to a mass 
litigation and the possibly resulting delays and limitations of his procedural 
rights. 
The German model case procedure is characterized by a three-tier procedure, 
starting from the petition for a model case decision in the trial court, leading to 
the resolution of the legal issues raised in the petition by the higher regional 
court and going back to the individual lawsuits before the trial courts. The 
sometimes procedurally time-consuming ping-pong match between the lower 
and the higher court produced long delays and proved to be very inefficient at 
times. That is why the amendment has tried to improve the conduct of the 
proceedings in order to accelerate the model case procedure and to enhance its 
efficiency. Even so, these changes have not eased the overall friction between 
the procedural needs necessarily arising from the bundling of individual claims 
and the regulatory goals sometimes lurking behind them. 
The newly introduced notification of claims does not amount to a full-fledged 
opt-in mechanism, but only suspends the limitation of claims. Therefore the 
participation threshold is not effectively  lowered and enforcement will not 
increase notably. As far as the new opt-out settlement under the amendment of 
the German Model Case Act of 2012 is concerned, one has to note that both 
regulatory interests as well as individual investor interests  enter into it. This 
shows in the necessary court approval from which no appeal shall lie, but which  
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can be invalidated by an opt-out of at least 30% of the joined parties, who can 
also opt-out on their own in order to avoid participation. 
The  remaining shortcomings and compromises of the amendment led the 
Green Party to present a reform proposal in the German Bundestag that aimed 
to replace the German Model Case Procedure Act with a universal group 
procedure act applicable to all civil and commercial matters in June 2013.
108 No 
ordinary filing of a lawsuit would be necessary anymore and there would be opt-
in possibilities  in order to keep costs low and eliminate participation 
thresholds.
109 At the same time, opt-out mechanisms were rejected because of 
the potential binding effect of the later decision on disagreeing parties against 
their will, if they fail to opt-out explicitly.
110  Not surprisingly, the  proposal 
ultimately only had  symbolic status  resulting from the  subsequent  general 
elections, which did not provide the Greens with the necessary votes necessary 
in parliament to pave the way for success. Therefore the remaining questions 
about the KapMuG of 2012 still have to be resolved. 
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